Hegel's Science of Logic can justifiably be called our philosopher's real opus magnum. This is the book in which Hegel invested his entire philosophical energy and it constitutes the standard against which everything else Hegel had to say must be measured-an opus then, it is fair to say, without which the rest of our philosopher's work cannot be understood. In the Science of Logic Hegel unfolds the world of "objective thinking" (GW XXI, 34; Miller 49) , the cosmos of the terms of thought, the "realm of thought" purely and simply "in its own immanent activity" (GW XXI, 10; Miller 31). Thought becomes its own object of interest, here thoughts are thought not just used; the determinations, or terms, of thought really are self-determinations of thinking, not imposed or determined by someone or something else, neither are they tools to think about something else that is not itself thought. Thought here is simultaneously form and content, which is what gives it an absolute significance, not merely a relative one bound to some kind of extra-logical material with which thought has to struggle as with something quite foreign to it. The Phenomenology of Spirit dealt with the structures of concrete knowing, in which consciousness had knowledge of itself, of its world and of the relative unity of the two specific to the given structure. Concrete knowing in the phenomenological sense is a kind of cognition that thinks about something other than thought, which is why its own thoughts can never be exhaustively filled with content. Concrete knowing in the sense of the Phenomenology as a cognition of appearances is itself an appearance, not an essential, self-sustaining form of knowledge. It only reaches that stage, as we have seen, in the final stage of "absolute knowing", that structure of cognition which is purely reflexive and no longer objective, no longer alienated and interrupted, refracted or subservient to an alien law.
Absolute knowing is the truth of all modes of consciousness, because the path through the Phenomenology produced the result that only in absolute knowing has the partition of object and self-certainty completely dissolved so that truth has become identical to this certainty and this certainty identical to the truth. (GW XXI, 33; Miller 49) Measured against the other patterns of concrete cognition developed in the Phenomenology, absolute knowing seems to be a completely empty form; it is pure knowing as such or the immediate 'light of reason' . Nothing is seen in this light, at first at least, especially coming directly from the glittering realm of appearing knowledge, the knowledge of appearances, and all its colourful imagery. Natural consciousness with its appearing knowledge never looks directly into the light of reason, into the logos itself. It prefers images that reflect this light in their own specific refraction. Moreover, it instinctively shields itself with its object-or image-knowledge against non-objective and image-free cognition. As Plato said, no-one ever left the cave of natural consciousness of their own free will, no-one freely acknowledged that the shadows they saw in the cave actually were shadows, mere pictures and symbols of the logical realm outside the cave. Hegel sees the phenomenological cunning of reason, including the self-application of the externalisation schema of time, ensuring that what is different from thought is er-innert-remembered, internalised (what is "outside" is brought "inside"), so that the images are revealed as mere images and the symbols are finally deciphered. We have already seen that for Hegel the course of history is not somehow external to the course of reason, rather it generates those pivotal moments, those turning points in which philosophy too effects the change, the conversion to a new standpoint. Right at the start of the first preface to the Science of Logic in 1812 Hegel says that "over the last twenty-five years or so philosophical thinking" has "undergone" a "sea change" and the Science of Logic aims to draw the consequences of this transformation for the realm of the pure terms of thought; it seeks to give expression in its own way to the "higher standpoint that the self-consciousness of spirit has attained for itself in this time period" (GW XXI, 5; Miller 25). The new, higher standpoint is quite simply that thinking has in principle thrown off its servitude to the things, to external compulsions and purposes and has become free or pure erinnerte, internalised thinking. Especially since Kant and Fichte, thinking has in principle liberated itself to think itself. Yet no-one had taken up the challenge of systematically developing the thinking that thinks itself as such-not even Fichte, who, as we know from Faith and Knowledge, never completely let go of finite knowledge and finite consciousness. At last, then, the Science of Logic offers a school for the upright gait of the consciousness which no longer bows before the things. The fact should not confuse us that even after that epochal sea change in philosophical thinking most people, at least most of the time, do not think thoughts, but think something else. Still, it is enough to know that the tight linkage between consciousness and the things no longer has to be its fate. Participation in the free concept is now a real option for philosophy.
